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Pre-dispute arbitration agreements in employment have the potential to revolutionize 
employment law.  Between the years 1990 to 1998, the number of civil rights-based employment 
actions filed in federal court against private companies almost tripled from 8,413 in 1990 to 
23,735 in 1998.1  Employment battles are often hard-fought.  Approximately one-third of the 
federal employment cases were tried in 1998; that percentage has since progressively decreased.2
Many employees never get to trial.  They are denied justice at the outset because of their 
inability to afford counsel.  Employees who opt to represent themselves are at an obvious 
disadvantage.  If they are able to retain counsel, employees rarely go to trial, and—when they 
do—only 35.5% obtain favorable outcomes.3
1 U.S. Dept. Of Labor, 2000 Report, “Future of Worker-Management Relations.”  Note that these figures do not 
include cases resolved by mediation or arbitration, by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) at 
the administrative level or cases filed in state court.  According to a Department of Justice study, over 30 million 
employment cases were filed in federal, state and local courts as of the year 2000.  See Dept. of Justice, Bureau of 
Justice Statistics at www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs (“DOJ”).
2
 Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Bureau of Justice Statistics Civil Rights Complaints Report, 1990–98 
(1998 BOJ Report).  The percentage of cases proceeding to trial has been steadily decreasing.  During the 2002 
calendar year, 1,049 civil rights-employment cases were filed in the Northern District of Illinois.  Over the same time 
period, 1,074 such cases were closed by the court.  Only 21 cases or 2% were tried before a jury to verdict, four 
more (or .4%) were tried before a judge, and two more or .2% were the subject of directed verdicts.  The majority 
were disposed of by settlement (445 or 41.4%), pre-trial motion (212 or 19.7%), or voluntary dismissal (124 or 
11.5%). 
3
 The 1998 BOJ Report notes that employees won in approximately 35% of the civil rights-employment cases tried 
during the 1990–98 time period.  Other statistical reports paint a bleaker picture for employees.  See generally Inter-
University Consortium for Political and Social Research at the University of Michigan (ICPSR), which contains data 
gathered by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts and the Federal Judicial Center, at 
http://www.icpsr.umich.edu.
2As these statistics suggest, employers fare better in federal court in terms of favorable 
outcomes.  However, they achieve success at considerable cost.  Defense costs and fees average 
in excess of $100,000 if a case is tried.  When coupled with the expenses associated with actual 
trial losses, most employers have difficulty shouldering their burden.  In 1998, the median 
damage award in jury cases was $137,000.4 In particular, 14.2% of the cases tried in 1998 
resulted in jury awards of more than $1 million; in 10.6% of the cases, the jury awards that year 
exceeded $10 million.5  In addition to actual damages, employers are subject to pre- and post-
judgment interest, compensatory damages and, in cases of intentional or reckless misconduct, 
punitive or liquidated damages.  Attorneys’ fees and costs may double when the employee 
prevails, since employers then face paying the plaintiff’s statutory fees and costs in addition to 
their own.6
Against this backdrop, in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams,7 the United States Supreme 
Court endorsed the broad enforcement of pre-dispute arbitration clauses in employment 
agreements.8  From a policy perspective, this endorsement was not surprising.  Clearly, the 
widespread arbitration of employment disputes promises to significantly reduce civil filings in 
federal court and, at the same time, provide a cost-effective alternative to litigation in resolving 
employment disputes.  Why, then, do employers and employees alike resist the urge to arbitrate 
such disputes?  
This article defines the permissible scope of arbitration agreements in employment and 
explores avenues to insure that both parties to the employment relationship view arbitration as a 
4
 1998 BOJ Report.
5 Id.
6 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(k) (Title VII’s fee provision); 29 U.S.C. §216(b) (fees under the Age Discrimination 
in Employment Act).  Costs are generally awarded to prevailing parties in federal litigation under Fed. R. Civ. P. 
54(d).  See also 28 U.S.C. §1920 for various expenses that may be taxed as costs.
7
 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
8 Id. at 119.
3viable, cost-effective means to resolve employment disputes.  It also proposes a model for district 
courts to use in referring employment disputes to arbitration.  That model is based on the parties’ 
pre- and post-dispute agreements to arbitrate and allows for the reformation of pre-dispute 
agreements that violate principles of basic fairness and mutuality.  Court-sanctioned binding 
arbitration would reduce the court’s civil docket and resolve employment disputes on a cost-
effective basis without threatening plaintiffs’ statutory remedies or fundamental notions of due 
process.
Part I: Circuit City and Its Progeny: Judicial Endorsement of Pre-Dispute Arbitration 
Agreements in Employment
Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) to quell judicial hostility toward 
arbitration agreements.9  In the early years following enactment, the Supreme Court endorsed 
Congress’s intent to “place arbitration agreements upon the same footing as other contracts”10
and consistently upheld written arbitration agreements in the commercial context.11
The FAA’s purpose is unmistakably commercial.12  More specifically, Section 2 of the 
Act provides that a written agreement to arbitrate “any maritime transaction or a contract 
evidencing a transaction involving commerce … shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, 
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”13  Less 
clear—at least from the statutory language—is whether the FAA governs employment-related 
agreements to arbitrate.   
9 See Id. at 118 (citing Allied-Bruce v. Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 272 (1995); see also Dean 
Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219-20 (1985); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510-11 
(1974).
10
 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 24 (1991).
11 See, e.g., Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1984); Scherk, 417 U.S. at 511, 519-20. 
12 See, e.g., Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 125 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
13
 Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2002).
4Section 1 of the Act provides that “nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of 
employment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or 
interstate commerce.”14  Until the Supreme Court decision in Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. 
Adams,15 courts struggled to determine whether Section 1 broadly excluded all types of 
employment agreements from the FAA’s reach.16 Circuit City resolved this issue, holding that 
Section 1 refers only to employment contracts of transportation workers directly engaged in 
commerce.17  Stated differently, the Supreme Court narrowly construed Section 1’s proscription 
to allow for arbitration clauses in all other types of employment agreements.   
Since Circuit City, lower courts continue to struggle with enforcement issues in the 
employment context where parties enter into an agreement to arbitrate as a condition of 
employment.18  This struggle involves the tension between the courts’ desire to protect 
employees’ statutory rights, while permitting employers to regulate their workplace with minimal 
judicial intervention.  
Employers increasingly seek pre-dispute binding arbitration agreements to avoid the costs 
and expenses associated with litigation.  However, most employees view arbitration agreements 
with disdain, as negatively impacting their statutory rights to attorney’s fees and compensatory 
and punitive damages under the anti-discrimination laws.  As a result, instead of viewing 
14
 9 U.S.C. § 1.
15
 532 U.S. 105 (2001)
16 See, e.g., Herring v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 894 F.2d 1020, 1023 (9th Cir. 1990); Arce v. Cotton Club, 883 F. Supp. 
117, 120 (S.D. Miss. 1995), interpreting Section 1broadly to exclude all types of employment agreements from the 
scope of the FAA.  But see, McWilliams v. Logicon, Inc., 143 F.3d 573, 575-76 (10th Cir. 1998); O’Neil v. Hilton 
Head Hosp., 115 F. 3d 272, 274 (4th Cir. 1997); Pryner v. Tractor Supply Co., 109 F.3d 354, 358 (7th Cir. 1997); 
Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465, 1470 (1997); Rojas v. TK Communications, Inc., 87 F.3d 745, 747-
48 (5th Cir. 1996), interpreting Section 1 to exclude only the arbitration of employment agreements related to 
transportation workers.
17
 532 U.S. at 119.
18 See, e.g., Spinetti v. Service Corp. Int’l, 324 F.3d 212 (3rd Cir. 2003); Musnick v. King Motor Co. of Ft. 
Lauderdale, 325 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2003); Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646 (6th Cir. 2003) (en 
banc); McCaskill v. SCI Management Corp., 298 F.3d 677 (7th Cir. 2003); Gannon v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 262 
F.3d 677 (8th Cir. 2001).
5arbitration as an opportunity to swiftly resolve their client’s dispute, employees’ counsel often 
challenge arbitration agreements on the grounds of lack of mutual obligation, coercion, or 
interference with statutory rights.  Many of these concerns would be alleviated with well-drafted 
arbitration agreements and through adoption of procedural safeguards in the arbitration process 
itself. 
A. Pre-Circuit City Arbitration Decisions
The Supreme Court first addressed the interplay of anti-discrimination statutes and the 
FAA in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corporation.19 Employee Robert Gilmer filed suit in 
district court claiming that he was discharged in violation of the Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA).20 However, because Gilmer agreed to a pre-dispute arbitration 
provision as part of his broker registration application, the Supreme Court compelled 
arbitration.21 In doing so, the Court reaffirmed its position that “by agreeing to arbitrate a 
statutory claim, a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only 
submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.”22
The Gilmer Court reasoned that Supreme Court precedent endorsed the arbitration of 
other federal statutory claims.23 and that nothing in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
or its legislative history precluded the arbitration of age claims.24 It further rejected any 
“generalized attacks” against the adequacy of arbitration procedures, such as the ability to retain 
impartial arbitrators, limited discovery procedures, restricted types of relief, or whether a written 
19
 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
20 Id. at 23.
21 Id. at 24, 35.
22 Id. at 26 (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985)).
23 Id. (citing antitrust, RICO and securities claims.)
24 Id.
6opinion would be issued.25  Instead, the Court emphasized that the “FAA’s purpose was to place 
arbitration agreements on the same footing as other contract.”26 However, because the arbitration 
agreement at issue was contained in a broker registration application and not with Gilmer’s 
employer, the Court failed to address the FAA’s scope in relation to individual employment 
contracts.27
Thus, Gilmer provided limited guidance on how to apply the FAA’s Section 1 
exemptions to employment contracts.  Some post-Gilmer courts construed Section 1 broadly to 
exclude the arbitration of all employment disputes from the FAA’s reach,28 while others excluded 
only the arbitration of employment agreements related to transportation workers.29 Again, the 
Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Circuit City construed Section 1 narrowly to exclude 
only employment contracts related to transportation workers directly engaged in commerce.30
B. Circuit City and the Wrinkle of EEOC v. Waffle House
By virtue of their signed employment applications, Circuit City employees agreed to 
arbitrate any dispute arising out of their application for employment, employment and/or 
termination of employment, including claims under the federal anti-discrimination laws.31
Accordingly, when employee Saint Clair Adams filed an employment discrimination suit, the 
25 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 30-32.
26 Id. at 33.
27 Id. at 25 n.2.
28 See, e.g., Herring, 894 F.2d at 1023; Arce, 883 F.Supp. at 120.
29 See, e.g., McWilliams, 143 F.3d at 575-76; O’Neil, 115 F.3d at 274; Pryner, 109 F.3d at 358; Rojas, 87 F.3d at 
747-48.
30 Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 109.
31
 Id. at 109-110.
7district court granted Circuit City’s motion to compel arbitration.32 The Ninth Circuit reversed, 
reasoning that Section 1 of the FAA excluded mandatory arbitration.33 The Supreme Court 
disagreed, limiting Section 1’s exemptions to transportation workers..34
In reaching it conclusion, the Circuit City Court rejected the argument that an 
employment contract was not “a contract evidencing a transaction involving interstate 
commerce,” and that Section 2 of the FAA extended only to commercial contracts.35 According 
to the Court, this interpretation “would make the section 1 exclusion provision superfluous.”36 In 
addition, it would be inconsistent with Gilmer, where arbitration of the employee’s ADEA claim 
was compelled under a broker registration application, not a commercial contract.37 The Court 
also restated its earlier determination that the FAA pre-empts state law.38
Less than a year after Circuit City, the Supreme Court declined to expand the scope of the 
FAA in EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc.39 There, the Court held that non-party public agencies are 
not bound by arbitration agreements arising out of the employment relationship.40
The facts in Waffle House limit its reach.  More specifically, Waffle House required its 
employees to sign pre-dispute arbitration agreements as a condition of employment.  The 
company discharged Eric Baker shortly after he suffered a seizure at work.41 Baker filed a 
discrimination charge with Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), challenging 
his discharge as a violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act.42 The Fourth Circuit held that 
the EEOC could pursue an enforcement action on behalf of Baker and the public interest, despite 
32 Id. at 110.
33 Id. at 110, 114; 9 U.S.C. §1.
34 Id. at 109, 120-21.
35 Id. at 113.
36
 Id. 
37 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 23.
38 Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 122 (citing the Court’s decision in Southland Corp., 465 U.S. 1).
39
 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Waffle House, Inc., 122 S.Ct. 754 (2001). 
40 Id. at 759.
8Baker’s pre-dispute arbitration agreement, since the EEOC was not a party to the agreement.  
However, the court limited the agency’s remedies to injunctive relief.43
The Supreme Court disagreed with this remedial limitation, noting that the FAA is 
designed to enforce private agreements and not to restrict a non-party’s choice of forum.44 The 
Court, thus, held that the EEOC could pursue a court action with victim-specific relief, including 
backpay, reinstatement, compensatory damages for pain and suffering and punitive damages for 
malicious and reckless conduct.45
 In theory, Waffle House creates a significant wrinkle in an employer’s ability to preclude 
employment discrimination suits through pre-dispute arbitration agreements.  In practice, Waffle 
House presents little impediment to employers seeking to resolve employment matters through 
arbitration.  The EEOC files less than two percent (2%) of all anti-discrimination claims in 
federal court.  That percentage only slightly increases (to close to 5%) in cases where the agency 
found reasonable cause following investigation.46 Indeed, the Waffle House Court relied on these 
and other statistics to assert that “… permitting the EEOC access to victim-specific relief in cases 
where the employee has agreed to binding arbitration, … will have a negligible effect on the 
federal policy favoring arbitration.”47
41 Id. at 758.
42 Id.; Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§12101–12213 (2202).
43 Waffle House, 122 S.Ct. At 759.
44 Id. at 764.
45 Id. at 764–66, abrogating EEOC v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 156 F.3d 298 (2d Cir. 1998) (limiting the EEOC to 
injunctive relief), and Merrill, Lunch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Nixon, 210 F.3d 814 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 
U.S. 941 (2001).
46
 Waffle House, 122 S.Ct. At 762 n.7, citing EEOC, Enforcement Statistics and Litigation (as visited Nov. 18, 
2001), http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/enforcement.html.  According to EEOC statistics, “in fiscal year 2000, the EEOC 
received 79,896 charges of employment discrimination.  Although the EEOC found reasonable cause in 8, 248 
charges, it only filed 291 lawsuits and intervened in 111 others.” Id.
47 Id.
9C. Post-Waffle House Lower Court Decisions
1. Cost- Splitting Provisions as a Threat to Enforcement
More threatening to arbitration finality than Waffle House are cases which refuse to 
enforce agreements that mandate that each party pay half the costs of arbitration48 or their own 
attorney’s fees.49 Historically, several courts found cost-splitting provisions to be unenforceable 
per se.50 The Supreme Court decision in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph51 changed this 
tide.  Since Green Tree, most courts address the issue of cost-splitting on a case-by-case basis to 
determine whether the potential cost of arbitration actually restricts an individual’s access to the 
arbitral forum.52 Rather than void the entire arbitration agreement if the cost provision is 
prohibitive, the trend is to sever the offensive provision and compel arbitration under the balance 
of the agreement.53
The Green Tree Court endorsed this case-by-case approach, refusing to void arbitration 
agreements silent on the issue of costs and fees as unenforceable per se.54 While the Court 
recognized that “large arbitration costs could preclude a litigant … from effectively vindicating 
her statutory rights in the arbitral forum,” it held that the party challenging the agreement must 
48 See Ingle v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 328 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2003); Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Randolph, 531 
U.S. 79 (2000); Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Sys., Inc., 238 F.3d 549 (4th Cir. 2001); Paladino v. Arnet 
Computer Techs., Inc., 134 F.3d 1054, 1062 (11th Cir. 1998).
49 See McCaskill, 298 F.3d 677 (7th Cir. 2003).  See also, Perez v. Globe Airport Sec. Servs., Inc., 253 F.3d 1280, 
1287 (11th Cir. 2001) (voiding agreement that required fee-splitting regardless of outcome).
50 These cases found that cost-splitting agreements deny claimants an effective forum in which to vindicate their 
statutory rights. See, e.g. Shankle v. B-G Maint. Mgmt. Of Col., Inc., 163 F.3d 1230 (10th Cir. 1999); Perez, 253 
F.3d 1280 (4th Cir. 2001); Paladino, 134 F.3d 1054 (11th Cir. 1998); Cole, 105 F.3d 1465, 1484 (D.C. 1997) 
(establishing cost-splitting provisions as unenforceable per se and stating that claimants “would never by required to 
pay for a judge in court”).
51 Green Tree, 531 U.S. 79. 
52
 See Spinetti, 324 F.3d at 217; Musnick, 325 F.3d at 1259; Morrison, 317 F.3d at 653, 660; Bradford, 238 F.3d at 
556.
53 See Spinetti,, 324 F.3d at 219-22; Morrison, 317 F.3d at 675, 677; Gannon v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 262 F.3d 
677, 680-81 (8th Cir. 2001).
54 Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 82, 92.  Although the issue in dispute arose out of a consumer/lending agreement, the 
Courts analysis is instructive on how to approach the issue of whether arbitration is cost-prohibitive, thus precluding 
a plaintiff’s ability to effectively vindicate his or her claim.
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show that the cost of arbitration is prohibitive.55  The Court criticized the plaintiff’s reliance on 
American Arbitration Association (AAA) cost estimates as “too speculative” to support her 
contention that costs precluded her from pursuing arbitration.56  Unfortunately, the Green Tree 
Court failed to offer more guidance on the type of evidence needed to show that arbitration is 
cost-prohibitive.57  This void has been filled, in part, by a handful of Circuits considering the 
issue.  The post-Green Tree courts have proposed various benchmarks for enforcement of cost-
splitting provisions in employment arbitration agreements.58
For example, in Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Sys., Inc.59 the Fourth Circuit 
posited that: 
“… the appropriate inquiry is one that evaluates whether the arbitral forum 
in a particular case is an adequate and accessible substitute to litigation, 
i.e., a case-by-case analysis that focuses, among other things, upon the 
claimant’s ability to pay the arbitration fees and costs, the expected cost 
differential between arbitration and litigation in court, and whether that 
cost differential is so substantial as to deter the bringing of claims.” 60
At least one problem with this approach exists where the plaintiff cannot produce a 
concrete estimate of arbitration costs during the initial stages of the proceeding.  Under these 
circumstances, the court may prematurely determine that characterizing arbitration as cost-
prohibitive is “too speculative.”61  To avoid this problem, the Third Circuit has suggested that 
limited discovery identifying the arbitrator and approximating the length of the proceedings may 
55 Id. at 90-91.
56 Id. at 91.
57 Id. at 92. To support her assertion that pursuing arbitration was cost-prohibitive, Randolph used information 
provided by the American Arbitration Association (AAA) to estimate the potential cost of arbitration.  Because the 
agreement did not designate an arbitrator, the court found that the estimates were insufficient to determine actual 
arbitration costs.  Id. at 91 n.6.  The dissent argued that, as a repeat player, the employer was in better position to 
estimate costs, and that this burden should not be placed on the plaintiff.  Id. at 96 (Ginsburg, J, dissenting). 
58 See Bradford, 238 F.3d at 556; Morrison, 317 F.3d at 663-65.
59
 238 F.3d 549 (4th Cir. 2001).
60 Id. at 556.
61 Morrison, 317 F.3d at 660.
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allow for a more accurate estimate of actual arbitration costs and the claimant’s ability to pay for 
them.62
The Sixth Circuit has taken the cost-splitting inquiry one step farther.  Recognizing that 
the federal discrimination laws protect individual rights as well as a “broader social purpose,” the 
Sixth Circuit has held that “[a] cost-splitting provision should be held unenforceable whenever it 
would have the ‘chilling effect’ of deterring a substantial number of potential litigants from 
seeking to vindicate their statutory rights.” 63  According to the Sixth Circuit, arbitration is cost-
prohibitive when “similarly situated individuals” would forgo claims against an employer based 
on the likelihood of substantial arbitration costs.64  Thus, in Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 
the Sixth Circuit considered this deterrent effect in terms of a former employee’s financial 
instability in determining whether to pursue arbitration where the risks of expending “scarce 
resources” would reap “uncertain benefit[s].”65  This approach involves an expansive reading of 
Green Tree, since the Green Tree holding only considered whether arbitration is cost-prohibitive 
to the individual plaintiff.66
A number of courts have opted to sever illegal cost-splitting provisions from arbitration 
agreements rather than void the entire agreement.67  In Spinetti v. Service Corporation 
62 See, e.g., Blair v. Scott Specialty Gases, 283 F.3d 595 (3rd Cir. 2002).  In Blair, the plaintiff submitted an affidavit 
of her limited financial capacity, but presented no evidence to establish the potential cost of arbitration.  Id. at 608.  
The Third Circuit found that additional discovery was appropriate where the agreement indicated that the AAA 
would preside over any disputes.  It, thus, remanded the case, so that the cost issue could be explored, giving the 
plaintiff the opportunity to prove that the potential cost of arbitration prevented her from vindicating her statutory 
rights.  On remand, the defendant was given an opportunity to show that arbitration costs were not prohibitive, or in 
the alternative, to pay the arbitration costs and fees.  Id. at 610.
63 Morrison, 317 F.3d at 661. 
64 Id.
65 Id. at 670.  However, because the agreement contained a severability clause, the court deleted the cost-splitting 
provision and compelled arbitration.  Id. at 675.
66 Green Tree, 531 U.S. at 90-91.
67 See, e.g., Gannon, 262 F.3d at 680 (endorsing severability of invalid terms where the arbitration agreement 
contemplated this result); Morrison, 317 F.3d at 675 (same).  This suggests that severability clauses are critical to the 
enforcement of arbitration agreements.
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International,68 the Third Circuit affirmed severance of a cost-splitting provision that required 
“each party to pay its own costs and attorney’s fees, regardless of the outcome of the arbitration,” 
as well as one-half of the arbitrator’s fees and other arbitration costs.69  As a result, the court 
compelled arbitration under the balance of the agreement.70  The Spinetti Court also found that, 
implicit in the district court’s decision to sever, was a finding that the employer bear the 
responsibility for all arbitration costs; by contrast, the issue of attorney’s fees was governed by 
the statutory fee-shifting provision.71
2. Limitation of Remedies Further Threaten Enforcement
The Spinetti court further identified a “tension” between two public policy concerns: the 
federal policy favoring arbitration and the policy ensuring that claimants effectively vindicate 
their statutory rights through the arbitral forum.72  Where an arbitration agreement infringes on a 
plaintiff’s statutory rights by restricting the amount or type of remedy to which a plaintiff is 
otherwise entitled, courts do not hesitate to sever the remedial provision,73 and sometimes even 
void the entire agreement.74  In McCaskill v. SCI Management Corporation, 75 the Seventh 
Circuit opted to void a pre-dispute arbitration agreement which contemplated the arbitration of 
all employment disputes without the recovery of attorney’s fees.  Notwithstanding the agreement, 
McCaskill filed a Title VII lawsuit arguing that the agreement was void and unenforceable, 
68
 324 F.3d 212.
69 Id. at 214-15.
70 Id. at 215, 223.
71 Id. at 218.
72 Id. at 213-14.
73 See, e.g., Morrison, 317 F.3d at 675; Gannon, 262 F.3d at 680.
74 See, e.g., McCaskill, 298 F.3d at 680 (7th Cir. 2003); Ingle, 328 F.3d at 1180 (9th Cir. May 13, 2003).
75
 298 F.3d 677 (7th Cir. 2002).
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because it required each party to pay its own attorney’s fees.76  Stated differently, McCaskill 
sought to void the agreement on the basis that the attorneys’ fee provision precluded her from 
vindicating her Title VII right to attorney’s fees as a prevailing plaintiff.77  In an earlier opinion 
in the case, the Seventh Circuit agreed that a plaintiff’s “statutory right to attorney’s fees … is 
essential to fulfill the remedial and deterrent functions of Title VII.”78  It, thus, determined that 
the entire agreement was unenforceable. 79  Severing the offensive provision was never raised as 
an option.80
In Spinetti, the Third Circuit severed the same fee provision presented in McCaskill.81
The court explained that it reached a different result based on the parties’ arguments.  Severance 
was never raised in McCaskill; by contrast, it was the “main issue” before the Spinetti court.82
The Third Circuit first considered whether Spinetti’s arbitration agreement was valid under state 
law.  Pennsylvania law provides that where an “essential” contract term is illegal, the entire 
contract is unenforceable.83  The court found that the agreement’s purpose was to resolve 
employment disputes and “not to regulate costs or attorney’s fees.”84  Partial enforcement of the 
agreement was, therefore, proper.  Indeed, the court could remove the illegal terms and modify 
the arbitration provision if equity so required.85
76 Id., at 678.  This decision endorsed an earlier decision by the Seventh Circuit, authored by Judge Rovner.  See 
McCaskill v. SCI Management Corp.., 285 F.3d 623 (7th Cir. 2002) rehearing granted and opinion vacated by 294 
F.3d 879 (7th Cir. 2003), on rehearing 298 F.3d 677 (7th Cir. 2003).  On rehearing, the Court declined to address the 
provision which required the parties to split arbitration costs, including arbitrator fees, holding that the entire 
agreement was unenforceable based upon a provision stated that prohibited recovery of attorney’s fees, in violation 
of Title VII. McCaskill 298 F.3d at 680. 
77 McCaskill, 298 F.3d at 680; see also McCaskill, 285 F.3d at 624.
78 McCaskill, 285 F.3d at 627.
79 Id. and on rehearing 298 F.3d at 680.
80 McCaskill, 298 F.3d at 685. (Rovner, J., concurring).
81 Spinetti, 324 F.3d at 221.
82 Id.
83 Spinetti, 324 F.3d at 214.
84 Id. at 219; See also, Gannon, 262 F.3d at 681 (“The essence of the [disputed] contract … is an agreement to settle 
… employment disputes through binding arbitration.”).
85 Spinetti, 324 F.3d at 219–20.
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Finally, in Spinetti, the Third Circuit rejected the EEOC’s position that “the employer 
should not have the benefit of a sanitized arbitration procedure stripped of the improper attorney 
fees and arbitration costs clauses” which would deter employees from seeking relief under 
arbitration agreements.86  The court found that such argument would, in fact, ultimately compel 
employees to seek judicial resolution, along with the burdens and fees associated with litigation.  
It also found that the EEOC’s position was against the federal policy favoring arbitration.  The 
court concluded that, “the increasing awareness by claimants’ counsel of their severability will, at 
least, ensure that employees who inquire about remedies will be given appropriate advice by 
counsel.”87
The Sixth Circuit also will sever—rather than void—arbitration agreements that limit 
front pay and punitive damages, as well as other remedies available to prevailing Title VII 
plaintiffs.88   In Morrison v. Circuit City, the Sixth Circuit consolidated two cases challenging the 
validity of an arbitration agreement under Title VII, in an en banc review.89  In the first case, 
Morrison signed an arbitration clause as part of her application for a managerial position with 
Circuit City.90  Morrison alleged that she was terminated because of race and sex discrimination 
and subsequently filed suit in district court.  Circuit City’s motion to compel arbitration was 
granted, and Morrison appealed.91
86 Id. at 223.
87 Id.
88 Morrison, 317 F.3d at 655, 670.   The agreement also required each party to pay it’s own attorney’s fees, but gave 
the arbitrator discretion to award reasonable attorney’s fees to an employee who “prevails at the arbitration.”
89 Id. at 652.
90 Id. at 654.
91 Id. at 655-56.  However, because the arbitration was not stayed, the parties participated in a hearing on Morrison’s 
claims and an award was issued.  Morrison did not seek judicial review of the arbitration award.  Despite the 
arbitration, the Sixth Circuit declined to dismiss the appeal as moot.  The court reasoned that it could still grant 
effectual relief in the event it determined that the arbitration clause was unenforceable and, thus, that the arbitration 
should have never taken place.  Id. at 656 n.2.  Ultimately the Sixth Circuit determined that the offensive provisions 
should have been severed before compelling arbitration; however, it affirmed the lower court’s decision, because the 
arbitration had already taken place, and the arbitrator failed to require Morrison to share in the cost of the 
proceedings or to apply any limitations on remedies.  Id. at 676.
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Circuit City adopted specific “Rules and Procedures” to govern the arbitration of 
employment disputes, including an intricate cost-splitting provision under which the 
claimant/employee was required to pay the initial $75 filing fee and Circuit City would advance 
subsequent arbitration costs.  Absent an award of costs to the prevailing party, the employee was 
required to pay one-half of the final arbitration costs within ninety days of the arbitration 
award.92  In addition, each party was responsible for its own attorney’s fees, subject to the 
arbitrator’s discretion.  
The rules also outlined discovery procedures and available remedies, including injunctive 
relief, back pay, front pay, compensatory damages, punitive damages, and a limited amount of 
monetary damages.93  The Morrison court found that the remedies provision undermined the 
remedial and deterrent purposes of Title VII, and that the cost-splitting provision would likely 
deter potential litigants from pursuing grievances due to the potential cost of arbitration.  Thus, it 
was appropriate for the court to sever the offensive provisions and enforce the balance of the 
agreement.94
In the second Morrison case, Mark F. Shankle agreed to binding arbitration as a condition 
of his employment with Pep Boys.  Shankle’s agreement stated that arbitrations held there under 
would follow the Model Employment Arbitration Procedures of the American Arbitration 
Association (AAA), “except as provided in this agreement.”95  The agreement further provided 
that arbitrators would be selected from a list of eleven arbitrators presented by the AAA, and that 
92 Id. at 654-55.
93 Id. at 655. 
94 Id. at 675. The Sixth Circuit rejected Morrison’s argument that the arbitration agreement lacked mutuality of 
consideration.  Id. at 667.  Although the company was free to modify or terminate the agreement at the end of each 
year, the court found that there was sufficient consideration based on the agreement’s termination clause, which 
required thirty days’ notice.  It also concluded that Morrison “knowingly and voluntarily waived her right to pursue 
her employment claims in federal court,” since she was highly educated, the waiver was clear and unambiguous, and 
applicants had three days to withdraw their consent.  Id. at 667-68.
95 Id. at 656.
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additional lists would be provided if the parties did not agree on a common person.96  The 
arbitrator’s fee was to be split between the employee and the company, with each party bearing 
his or her other costs and attorney’s fees, unless the arbitrator awarded fees to the prevailing 
party.97
When Shankle sought severance pay following his resignation from Pep Boys, he was 
informed that the parties’ prior agreement required that the claim be arbitrated.  Although 
Shankle initiated arbitration, under the advice of new counsel, he tried to withdraw therefrom and 
sue Pep Boys in federal court for alleged violations of Title VII.  The district court granted 
Shankle’s motion to stay arbitration and held that the agreement’s cost-splitting provision was 
unenforceable.  Concerned with discrepancies between the procedures stated in the company’s 
arbitration agreement and those followed by the AAA, the district court struck the remainder of 
the agreement as unenforceable, finding “no meeting of the minds as to the procedures to be 
followed during the arbitration.”98  The Sixth Circuit acknowledged significant discrepancies 
between the agreement procedures and those followed by AAA.  Nevertheless, the court elected 
not to void the entire agreement.  Instead, it compelled arbitration under the agreement’s 
supremacy clause.99
3. The New Wrinkle: Are Class Actions Permitted in Arbitration, and Who 
Decides this Issue?
96 Id.
97 Id. at 657.
98 Id.
99 Id. at 680.  
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Until recently, the concepts of arbitration and classwide relief were considered by most to 
be mutually exclusive.100 That changed with the recent Supreme Court decision in Green Tree 
Financial Corporation v. Bazzle.101 In a plurality opinion authored by Justice Breyer, the court 
held that an arbitrator should decide whether the underlying agreements forbid class arbitrations 
where they were silent on the subject.102 The court, thus, rejected caselaw which upheld the 
judicial authority to direct class-wide arbitrations and vacated a judgment entered by the South 
Carolina Supreme Court.103
Bazzle involved two cases and two financing agreements with Green Tree Financial.  
Both agreements contained clauses requiring the arbitration of all contract-related disputes.  In 
the first case, Lynn and Burt Bazzle sued Green Tree in state court, claiming that their standard 
financing agreement for home improvements violated South Carolina law by failing to provide 
them with a legally required form advising them of their right to select their own attorney and 
insurance agent.104  The Bazzles amended their complaint to include class allegations and moved 
for class certification. Green Tree moved to stay the court action and to compel arbitration based 
on the parties’ agreement.  The state court certified a class and compelled class-wide arbitration.
Similarly, Daniel Lackey and George and Florine Buggs sued Green Tree for failing to 
allow for attorney and insurance agent preferences in their finance agreements to purchase 
mobile homes.  Lackey sought class certification, and Green Tree sought arbitration.  After an 
appellate court found the arbitration clause to be enforceable, the parties consented to arbitration 
100 See, e.g,. Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., 55 F.3d 269, 274 (7th Cir. 1999); Med. Ctr. Cars, Inc. v. Smith, 727 So.2d 
9, 20 (Ala. 1998) (refusing to recognize class-based arbitration absent an arbitration clause expressly allowing class-
based arbitration). 
101
 __ U.S. __, 123 S.Ct. 2402, 156 L.Ed.2d 414 (2003).
102 123 S.Ct. at 2407–08.  Justices Scalia, Souter and Ginsburg joined in the opinion.  Justics Stevens concurred in 
the judgment.  Id. at 2408–09.
103 Id. at 2408, vacating and remanding 351 S.C. 244, 569 S.E.2d 349 (2000).
104 Id. at 2405.
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before the same arbitrator appointed to handle the Bazzles’dispute.105 The arbitrator certified a 
class over Green Tree’s objection.
Both the Bazzle and Lackey arbitrations resulted in multi-million dollar class awards, 
including attorneys’ fees and costs, based on the arbitrator’s finding that the financing 
agreements violated South Carolina’s consumer protection law.106  The trial court confirmed both 
awards, denying Green Tree’s motions to vacate.  Green Tree appealed, claiming that class 
arbitration was legally impermissible under its financing agreements.
The South Carolina Supreme Court withdrew both cases from the appeals court to assume 
jurisdiction over a consolidated appeal. It noted that where the parties’ agreement is silent on the 
subject of class arbitration, South Carolina will construe this “ambiguity” against the drafting 
party.  Accordingly, the court held that state law interpreted silent agreements as permitting class 
arbitrations.107  The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether this 
holding was consistent with the FAA, but never reached this question.108  Instead, the Court 
remanded the case to the arbitrator to decide whether the agreement language allowed for class 
arbitration.
The plurality considered this issue to be one of contract interpretation and, thus, within 
the arbitrator’s purview.109 The court explained that the agreement language was ambiguous and 
that any doubts about the scope of arbitration should be resolved in favor of arbitration.110
105 Id. at 2405–06.
106 Id. at 2405–06.  Specifically, the Bazzle class was awarded $10,935,000 in statutory damages, along with 
attorneys’ fees.  The Lackey class was awarded $9,200,000 plus fees.
107 123 S.Ct. at 2406.
108 Id.  Implicit in the plurality holdup is a finding that the FAA did not foreclose class arbitration; otherwise, it 
would not have reached the state law question of contract interpretation.
109 123 S.Ct. at 2406–07.
110 Id. at 2407, (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985)).
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The plurality further distinguished the issue of class arbitrability from other “gateway matters” 
decided by the courts, including whether the parties agreed to arbitration and “whether a 
concedely binding arbitration clause applies to a certain type of controversy.”111
Without question, the availability of class arbitration could be deemed a “gateway matter” 
of the latter variety.  By characterizing the issue as one of contract interpretation and not 
jurisdiction, the Supreme Court expanded the arbitrator’s role beyond the four corners of the 
contract.  It justified this result by framing the relevant question in terms of “the kind of 
arbitration proceeding the parties agreed to.”112 According to the Court, that question concerned 
neither a state statute nor judicial procedures.  Under these circumstances, an arbitrator was 
deemed “well-suited” to decide the question.113
Chief Justice Rehnquist argued in his dissent that the issue of class-wide arbitration 
should be left to the courts, since it is “more akin” to questions of “what shall be arbitrated,” 
which are decided by courts and not arbitrators.114  Justices Kennedy and O’Connor joined in the 
dissent.  They interpreted the underlying agreements to limit arbitration to the contracting 
parties.115  In their view, Green Tree was denied its right to select an arbitrator for each dispute 
when—in a class context—the same arbitrator was imposed to resolve multiple claims.116
Although Green Tree was not an employment case, its language is broad enough to 
impact employment arbitrations.  Still unclear is the extent to which courts will endorse contract 
provisions which ban class arbitrations.  Such clauses have been voided as against public policy 
111
 123 S.Ct. at 2407. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. (citing Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002)).
114 123 S.Ct. at 2410 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting, in which Justices O’Connor and Kennedy joined).  Justice Thomas 
filed a separate dissent on the ground that the FAA does not apply to state court proceedings.  Id. at 2411.
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 2411.
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under California law.117   Bazzle did not address this issue, since its holding was prescribed by 
the contract language.  Indeed, a broader holding would have mandated that the class arbitration 
issue be decided by a court as a matter of jurisdiction.118
The Supreme Court’s obvious split on the issue of class arbitrations raises these and other 
policy concerns.  There is also the danger of inconsistent opinions if arbitrators decide whether to 
allow a matter to proceed to class arbitration.  This danger is underscored by the fact that 
arbitration decisions are without precedential value.119 To avoid uncertainty, arbitration clauses 
must address the issue of whether class arbitration is contemplated and who will determine any 
ambiguities concerning arbitrability.
Part II: Ensuring Fundamental Fairness: Drafting Implications for Arbitration 
Agreements and Other Procedural Safeguards
The increasing use of pre-dispute arbitration clauses in employment agreements has the 
potential to significantly reduce civil filings in federal courts while, at the same time, providing a 
cost-effective alternative to litigation.120  Employers generally recognize the cost benefits of 
arbitration.  Employees, by contrast, are afraid to waive their right to a judicial forum and seek 
assurances for the protection of their legal and statutory rights.  But this fear is often unfounded.  
It assumes biased arbitrators and that arbitration costs will exceed litigation expenses based on 
unfair comparisons.  Rarely do these comparisons consider protracted discovery expenses unique 
to litigation or the fact that plaintiff’s employment lawyers typically charge litigation retainers 
117 See Ingle, 328 F.3d at 1175–76.
118 See, e.g., First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaylan, 514 U.S. 938, 945 (1995).
119 See generally Harris, “The Use of Precedent in Labor Arbitration,” 32 Arb.J.26 (1977). While arbitrators are not 
bound by the doctrine of stare decisis, they may follow other decisions as persuasive where different parties and 
agreements are involved.
120 See e.g., Evan J. Spelfogel, Mandatory Arbitration v. Employment Litigation, 54 Disp. Resol. J. 78 (May 1999).
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and, increasingly, reduced hourly rates.121 Instead, they compare filing fees among the various 
forums without regard to the additional expenses associated with jury demands or the fact the 
employers are likely to cover the arbitration fees in light of recurring enforcement problems that 
result when the employee is forced to bear costs.122 When more realistic comparisons are 
employed, arbitration emerges as a prompt and economical alternative to the litigation of
employment disputes.  
There is also evidence to suggest that employees more often prevail before an arbitrator 
than in court, although their awards may be less in arbitration.123 Awards may be “evened out” 
through remedial provisions in arbitration agreements that allow employees to recover all 
statutory remedies in the arbitral forum.  To insure full relief and that arbitration is generally 
viable, a well-drafted agreement is critical.  This will help to ensure due process, protect 
employee rights and alleviate employee concerns that arbitrations favor employers. 
A. Contract & Drafting Implications to Ensure Substantive Due Process
Drafting an effective arbitration agreement begins by adhering to the basic contract 
principles of offer, acceptance and consideration.  The language of an arbitration agreement
121 See e.g., Public Citizen, “The Costs of Arbitration,” 40–44 (May 2002), at http://www.citizen.org/publications/.  
Few employees can afford to pay attorneys on an hourly basis, even when rates are reduced.  Statutory fees provide 
little incentive to plaintiff’s counsel who spend hundreds of hours in discovery and responding to pretrial motions 
without relief.  Because of these and other factors (including judicial decisions increasing a plaintiff’s burden of 
proof in discrimination cases), the pool of competent plaintiff’s counsel is diminishing.  This trend, too, impacts 
employees’ access to justice.  Arbitrations promise to reverse this trend if plaintiff’s counsel are allowed to obtain 
statutory fees in an expedited forum in which their rate of success exceeds that available in federal court.  At least 
thus far, plaintiffs’ counsel continue to resist arbitration efforts, sometimes through propaganda that is more fiction 
than fact.  See, e.g., “Mandatory Arbitration Subverts Civil Rights Laws” at the National Employment Lawyers 
Association website, http://www.nela.org.
122 Id. at 43.
123 See generally, Lisa B. Bingham, Is There a Bias in Arbitration of Nonunion Employment Disputes? An Analysis 
of Actual Cases and Outcomes, 6 Int’l J. Conflict Mgmt. 369 (1995); Inter-University Consortium for Political and 
Social Research, http://www.icpsr.umich.edu.
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should clearly express the parties’ intent to resolve disputes through binding arbitration rather 
than through a judicial forum.
There is a presumption that signed employment applications or employment agreements, 
including contracts of adhesion, are voluntary.124  Courts have stricken only a handful of 
agreements as unconscionable, where the agreement is uneven.125  Thus, an agreement was 
stricken which unilaterally required employees to arbitrate without creating a corresponding 
obligation on the employer.  Agreements which give employers exclusive control over the pool 
of potential arbitrators will, likewise, be stricken as violating basic notions of due process.126  By 
contrast, where the agreement is supported by consideration, and the employer is equally 
obligated to arbitrate employment-related disputes, the arbitration agreement will withstand 
arguments that it is against public policy or unconscionable.127
The more common threat to enforcement and a principal concern of employee advocates 
lies in provisions that compromise an employee’s statutory remedies or legal rights.  Green Tree
and its progeny stand for the proposition that courts may sever clauses that render arbitration 
cost-prohibitive or otherwise limit employee remedies.128  Even class actions may be pursued in 
arbitral and judicial forums.129 The ultimate question is how far courts should go in reforming 
agreements that are silent on critical issues or lack mutuality.
124 See, e.g., Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 33 (“Mere inequality in bargaining power, however, is not a sufficient reason to 
hold that arbitration agreements are never enforceable in the employment context”). 
125 See, e.g., Ingle, 328 F.3d at 1173–74 (finding that the arbitration agreement was one-sided because it “essentially 
cover[ed] only claims that at employees would likely bring against [the employer],” but not claims that the employer 
might bring against employees).
126 See McMullen v. Meijer, Inc., 337 F.3d 697, 703–05 (6th Cir. 2003) (per curiam) (finding the arbitrator-selection 
process fundamentally unfair.)
127 See, e.g., Morrison, 317 F.3d at 668 (plaintiff  “knowing and voluntarily waived her right to pursue her 
employment claims in federal court” considering the fact that she was highly educated, the waiver to file suit in court 
was clear, and applicants had three days to withdraw their consent); Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Ahmed, 283 F. 3d 
1198 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that an arbitration agreement was not procedurally unconscionable where employee 
had the opportunity to opt out of program implementing binding arbitration, but did not do so). 
128 Green Tree, 531 U.S. 79; See also Spinetti, 324 F.3d at 219–20.
129 See Bazzle, 123 S.Ct. at 2407. 
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When drafting arbitration agreements, employers must consider whether to exclude cost-
splitting provisions altogether or limit their scope to those cases in which the recovery of costs 
and fees will not effectively deny employees their right to representation.  Arbitrators determine 
whether cost-splitting is prohibitive, based on a number of factors, including: whether the 
employee is currently employed; the identity of, and fees associated with the arbitrator presiding 
over the dispute; and the cost of initial filing fees.130  The arbitrator also may request additional 
discovery to decide whether particular any cost-splitting measures are deserving of 
enforcement.131
Alternatively, the arbitration agreement may exclude cost-splitting provisions.  The 
presumption here is that the employer will bear the cost of arbitration.132   The agreement also 
may state that the employer bears all costs.  But even in this scenario, the employer comes out 
ahead, since the cost of arbitration is significantly less than the cost of protracted litigation.133
To eliminate any perceived bias that the arbitrator favors the party who pays, the arbitrator’s fees 
should be paid through the entity administrating the arbitration and not directly to the 
arbitrator.134   To alleviate concerns of unconscionability, the cost provisions must be clearly 
spelled out.  
Although courts often sever provisions that limit statutory remedies, it is not in the 
employer’s best interest to include provisions likely to threaten enforcement.  By doing so, the 
advantages of arbitration are diminished or lost, as parties waste time and resources challenging 
130 Bradford, 238 F.3d at 556; Morrison, 317 F.3d at 670. 
131 E.g., Blair, 283 F.3d at 610, supra note 63.
132 See, e.g., Spinetti, 324 F.3d at 218, supra note 72.
133
 Linda Goodspeed, Litigation’s Rising Price Tag Boosts Arbitration’s Appeal, Boston Bus. J.( Oct. 7, 2002) at 
http://boston.bizjournals.com/boston/stories/2002/10/07/focus3.html; Helen W. Gunnarsson, Law Pulse, 90 Ill. B. J.
282, 285 (2002). 
134
 American Arbitration Association, A Due Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes 
Arising out of the Employment Relationship at http://www.adr.org/index2.1.jsp?JSPssid=15769 (May 9, 1995) 
[hereinafter Due Process Protocol].  The Due Process Protocol was established in 1995 by individuals representing 
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or defending offensive provisions.  The wiser course is to design agreements that expressly 
protect employees’ statutory rights and provide the same remedies as are available in law or 
equity.135
For example, arbitration agreements should acknowledge an employee’s right to counsel 
and encourage the employee to review the agreement with counsel before signing it.136  Because 
it is in the employer’s interest to expedite hiring and other employment decisions, the agreement 
should set a reasonable review period (such as five business days) before the employment offer is 
withdrawn.  Where the agreement to arbitrate is part of an employment application, the employer 
should provide an opt-out period of at least three days.137
B. Due Process Safeguards
Procedural safeguards are integral to the successful arbitration of employment disputes 
and to quell employee perceptions that arbitrations favor employers.  Arbitration agreements 
should, therefore, provide that the parties jointly select the arbitrator, define the types of disputes 
to be arbitrated, and establish available remedies.   Where the arbitration agreement and 
proceedings comport with due process requirements, employees need not fear any compromise of 
their legal rights.  
Perhaps, the most significant distinction between arbitral and judicial forums is the right 
to jury trial.  At least in the context of employment discrimination, employees who pursue 
arbitration waive their right to present their claims to a jury.  The absence of procedural checks 
labor, management, employment, civil rights organizations, private administrative agencies, government and the 
American Arbitration Association.  It was amended, effective November 1, 2002.
135 See, e.g., Due Process Protocol supra note 112; see also supra text accompanying note 23.  
136 See Due Process Protocol supra note 112.
137 See Morrison, 317 F.3d at 668.
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and balances further distinguishes the two types of forums.  Arbitration decisions are not 
disturbed except for abuses of discretion.138
Ironically, the advantages of arbitration are realized, in part, through diminished 
procedural safeguards.  Arbitration is more expedient and cost-effective than litigation, because 
the process is streamlined and the arbitration decision is final and binding.  A compromise 
position assuages employee concerns by establishing minimum procedural safeguards in the 
arbitral process.139  These minimum safeguards may include: 
C A neutral arbitrator with expertise in employment issues, particularly statutory anti-
discrimination claims; 
C Employer and employee participation in selecting the arbitrator;
C Limited pre-trial discovery methods to obtain relevant information, yet designed to curb 
discovery abuse;
C Application of the Federal Rules of Evidence;
C Right to representation by counsel;
C Arbitrator discretion of cost allocation;
C Arbitrator authority to award remedies available at law and in equity; and
C Issuance of a written opinion.
A practical impediment to the arbitration of employment disputes arises in the limited 
pool of available arbitrators with expertise in employment law.140  Arbitration has thrived in the 
traditional labor context, since collective bargaining agreements typically include arbitration 
provisions as the final step in a grievance process.141  Labor arbitrators, adept at contract 
interpretation in a union setting, often have little or no experience in matters of statutory
138
 Nile J. Williamson, Arbitration clauses in Employment Contracts: to Do or Not to Do, 39 Labor and Employment 
Law (Ill. State Bar Ass’n) May 2002, at 3. 
139 See e.g., Spelfogel supra note 102; Due Process Protocol supra note 112; American Arbitration Association, 
National Rules for the Resolution of Employment Disputes (“NRRED”) at 
http://www.adr.org/index2.1.jsp?JSPssid=15747 (as amended and effective November 1, 2002).
140 See Due Process Protocol supra note 112; Prospects for Employment Arbitration Use Debated at American Bar 
Association Meeting, 18 Individual Employee Rights (BNA) Sept. 3, 2002, at 78.
141
 Dennis Nolan, Labor and Employment Arbitration: What’s Justice Got To Do With It?, 53 Disp. Resol. J. 40, 44 
(1998).
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interpretation arising under anti-discrimination laws.142  Through training, arbitrators may be 
educated about substantive, procedural and remedial issues related to anti-discrimination statutes 
as well as general issues otherwise arising out of the employment relationship. 143
Neutrality furthers the interests of both parties by helping to ensure the finality of binding 
arbitration.  An arbitrator must disclose financial or other interests that may result in a conflict of 
interest, any previous relationship with the party, or personal knowledge concerning the dispute, 
so that parties may make an informed decision.144  Both employer and employee should 
participate in selection of the arbitrator.  For example, the agency presiding over the arbitration 
can give the parties a list of arbitrators, including their experience and other information to 
identify potential conflicts of interest.  Parties may choose an arbitrator from this list by 
agreement or process of elimination.145
To the extent the agreement is silent on the topic of fees and costs, it must afford the 
arbitrator with the discretion to allocate costs and fees between the parties and to award remedies 
available in law and in equity.  The arbitrator should reduce his or her opinion to writing and 
allow for limited discovery to allow employees to obtain information relevant to their claims.146
Such safeguards help assure that employees’ due process rights are protected. 
In Gilmer, the Supreme Court recognized that the arbitration discovery procedures were 
more limited than in the federal courts, but that “by agreeing to arbitrate, a party trades the 
procedures and opportunity for review of the courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and 
142 Id. at 46-47
143 See Due Process Protocol, supra note 112.
144 Id.
145 See, e.g., Morrison, 317 F.3d at 654, 656. 
146 See e.g., Blair, 283 F.3d at 610 and supra text accompanying note 63.  Note, however, that the discovery process 
must be restricted to curb discovery abuses that could delay the arbitration hearing or significantly increase the costs 
associated with it.  
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expedition of arbitration.”147 The Court also found that the NYSE discovery provisions, which 
allowed for document production, information requests, depositions and subpoenas, where 
sufficient.148  Whether the procedures are promulgated by the employer in the arbitration 
agreement or by the agency presiding over the dispute, the rules should encourage the arbitrator 
to permit broader discovery, if necessary.149
Additional safeguards may include limitations on the use of hearsay to insure that 
arbitration testimony has certain minimal indicia of reliability.  Current arbitration practice 
allows for the admission of hearsay, as long as the opponent is afforded the opportunity to cross-
examine the hearsay declarant.
Part III: Proposal
The idea of less formal and more expedited methods of dispute resolution to relieve the 
burdened judicial system has been a topic of debate since the 1970s.150  In 1998, Congress 
enacted the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act,151 endorsing ADR programs as a means to 
provide “innovative methods of resolving disputes, and greater efficiency in achieving 
settlements,” as well as reduce federal judicial backlog.  Section 652 of the Act states that “each 
district court shall … require that litigants in all civil cases consider the use of an alternative 
147 Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 31.
148 Id.
149
 Nolan supra note 120, at 47.  For example, the AAA National Rules for the Resolution of Employment Disputes
(NRRED) give the arbitrator authority to order discovery including deposition, interrogatory, and document 
production “as the arbitrator considers necessary to a full and fair exploration of the issues in dispute, consistent with 
the expedited nature of arbitration.”  Another time-saving measure is the pre-hearing Arbitration Management 
Conference, giving the parties an opportunity to “explore and resolve matters that will expedite the arbitration 
proceedings.”  However, NRRED do not apply the Federal Rules of Evidence.
150 See Dispute Resolution, 88 Yale L.J. 905 (1979).
151
 28 U.S.C. § 651-658 (2002).
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dispute resolution process at an appropriate state in the litigation,152 and Section 654 specifically 
provides for arbitration where appropriate.153
Despite widespread endorsement, the potential for alternative dispute resolution to 
revolutionize employment law is far from realized.  Linking arbitration to the judicial system 
would help parties feel more comfortable with arbitration, rather than considering it a secondary 
alternative to litigation.  And by targeting cases that are ripe for settlement, court-facilitated 
arbitration would alleviate judicial backlog and filings.154
As a practical matter, the initial inquiry into whether court-facilitated arbitration is 
appropriate should begin when a complaint is filed.  The parties would be requested to complete 
a questionnaire at the outset of litigation to identify disputes that are ripe for arbitration.  To 
determine whether arbitration is compelled under a pre-dispute agreement, the questionnaire 
would seek information as to whether the parties entered into an employment agreement with a 
mandatory arbitration clause and, if so, the terms of that clause.  Where an agreement to arbitrate 
exists, the court should dismiss the litigation if the arbitration is to be final and binding unless 
provisions for cost-splitting or limitation of remedies threaten enforcement.  
152 Id. at § 652.
153 Id. at § 654.  For example, in Illinois, various methods of ADR are authorized or required in both state and
federal judicial systems. See Jennifer E. Shack and Danielle Loevy, Summary of Court-Related ADR in Illinois, 
Center for Analysis of Alternative Dispute Resolution Systems, at http://www.caadrs.org/studies/adr_summary.htm 
(last modified May 15, 2002); Suzanne J. Schmitz, Using ADR for your Client: An Illinois Lawyer’s Guide, 85 Ill. 
B.J. 64 (1997).
154 The model proposed here requires judicial intervention, both in referring cases to binding arbitration and in 
reviewing and sometimes reforming pre-dispute arbitration agreements to ensure that the agreement contains due 
process safeguards and is not otherwise unconscionable.  It thus differs from current court-annexed, non-binding 
arbitration programs funded by Congress that exist in ten federal districts nationwide, including:  the Eastern District 
of Pennsylvania, the Middle District of Florida, the Western District of Missouri, the Western District of Oklahoma, 
the Middle District of North Carolina, the Western District of Michigan, the Northern District of California, the 
Eastern District of New York and the Western District of Texas.  See Meierhoefer, Court-Annexed Arbitration in 
Ten District Courts (1990).  Under these programs, parties who are dissatisfied with the arbitration decision may 
demand a trial de novo within a set time period.  Absent timely demand for a trial de novo, the arbitration award 
becomes a non-appealable judgment of the court.  Id. at 3.
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Where enforcement of a pre-dispute clause is questionable because of remedial or cost-
splitting provisions, the court may reform the agreement to allow for arbitration under 
circumstances that will comport with notions of fundamental fairness and insure that prevailing 
plaintiffs secure their statutory remedies.  To the extent that the parties dispute whether the 
arbitration clause is itself enforceable, the court may resolve the issue early on through a petition 
for declaratory relief and avoid needless litigation in the process.  
Even where the parties failed to provide for arbitration on a pre-dispute basis, a court-
endorsed questionnaire could explore whether the parties are currently interested in pursuing 
arbitration as an alternative to litigation.  Such post-dispute arbitration would be particularly 
appropriate in situations where there is a pro se litigant, a small amount in controversy, or a 
continued relationship between the parties.  Other considerations favoring arbitration would 
include: time constraints, the failing health of parties or key witnesses, and the parties’ ability or 
inability to pay for litigation.  The court could dismiss the claims at its initial hearing if the 
parties agreed to submit their dispute to binding arbitration.  A consent form signed by the 
parties, similar to that used to refer matters to a magistrate judge, could allow for post-dispute 
arbitration and memorialize the agreement to do so.  Due process safeguards should be insured in 
any post-dispute agreement to arbitrate.
Conclusion
While arbitration is not a panacea for problems that plague the judicial system, it may 
alleviate those problems and emerge as a cost-effective option to the litigation of employment 
disputes.  Courts continue to flush out enforcement issues related to unconscionability, fee-
shifting, statutory remedies and procedural issues, including class actions.  Within these 
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boundaries, the possibilities for arbitration are limited only by the terms of the parties’ agreement 
and concepts of fundamental fairness.  
Under the proposed model, courts would insure that the letter and spirit of employment 
arbitration agreements comport with procedural due process, in theory and in practice.  To 
achieve widespread adoption, the judiciary needs to proactively endorse arbitration as a viable 
alternative to litigation.  Judging by the impact to date of Circuit City v. Adams and its progeny, 
expanding the FAA’s reach fails to go far enough.  What is needed, in addition, is a court-
sanctioned model through which courts and arbitrators can work together to minimize judicial 
backlog and maximize results.  Employment disputes are a good starting point for realizing these 
goals and objectives.
